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CATHOLICS AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND SINCE
THE PROTESTANT REVOLT
CHARLES F. MULLETTt

I

T HE history of Catholic persecution in England under the penal laws

1

has often received attention, but certain gaps remain. Neither

the penal laws, seemingly so explicit, nor private papers with their
melancholy cry entirely reveal the sufferings for which litigation supplies such excellent evidence. No one can deny the burden of the laws;
rather, it is a question whether the student appreciates what burdens
such legislation specifically imposed or indirectly permitted. Penal laws
had not less significance as enabling acts than as weapons per se. To
the penalties they inflicted must be added the gnawing extensions of
those penalties as well as their more precise definition, especially since
the laws were so extreme that they often went unenforced. We may apprehend the formal prohibition of political power; we may not at the
same time comprehend what the absence of that power means or how
it is brought about. We may see the injustice in labelling a religion as
superstition; we do not so quickly grasp that the adherents of this
"superstition" often are deprived of citizenship. Indeed, since not all
persons seem to qualify for martyrdom, the corrosive insecurity attendant upon unanticipated projections of the penal laws probably accomplished as much as the laws themselves in driving Englishmen to conformity to the Anglican Church.
This generalization applies to all religious nonconformists in England
from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Nevertheless, although
at times the weight of governmental penalties, court judgments, and
f Associate Professor of History, University of Missouri.
1. A brief reference to the penal laws may be of value. In addition to those statutes
transferring sovereignty from the pope to the monarch, as well as those dealing with
uniformity, elections, and monasteries, the following had especial significance: The Chantry
Act, 1547, 1 Edw. VI, c. 14; "An Act to retain the Queen's Majesty's Subjects in their
due Obedience," 1581, 23 Eliz. c. 1; "An Act against Jesuits. . . .", 1585, 27 Eliz. c. 2;
29 Eliz. c. 6 (1587); 35 Eliz. c. 1 (1593); 35 Eliz. c. 2 (1593); "An Act for the better
discovering and repressing Popish Recusants", 1605, 3 Jac. I, c. 4; "An Act to prevent
and avoid Dangers which may grow by Popish Recusants," 1605, 3 Jac. I, c. 5 (1605);
7 Jac. I, c. 6 (1609); The Test Acts, 1672, 25 Car. II, c. 2 and 1677, 30 Car. II, c. 2;
"An Act to vest in the two Universities the Presentations of Benefices belonging to
Papists," 1688, 1 Will. & Mar. sess. 1, c. 26; "An Act for the further preventing the
growth of Popery," 1699, 11 & 12 Will. III, c. 4. There were of course numerous other
penal laws, but these figured most consistently in the cases which follow. Where no title
has been given, the acts amplify some of the preceding statutes.
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social disapproval fell heavily upon the Protestant dissenters, Catholics
suffered the most protracted and ubiquitous persecution.'2 At first, the
burden was almost entirely legislative; while severe, it could be anticipated. At an early date, however, a refinement of disabilities appeared:
the courts began to apply the penal laws to novel ends, ends that might
have been deduced but were quite conceivably not anticipated when
Parliament enacted the statutes. That these laws prohibited the enjoyment of freedom or the exercise of political power was not enough;
henceforth, they covered many non-political functions. Of course, novelty did not characterize every bit of litigation, for in many, many cases
the statutes were at once distressingly specific and all-inclusive. Yet
the very suits that came into court show that men either did not know
a given statute existed-else they would not have put themselves so distinctively within its application-or they did not realize on what occasion the statute might be extended to restrict or punish activities hitherto
unsuspected of lying within its scope. The latter seems the more likely.
To suffer persecution was bitter; never to know in what unexpected
fashion that persecution might strike brought despair-and conformity.
To appreciate this situation fully, the cold, impersonal records of the
courts, usually devoid of hysteria or patent intolerance, are invaluable.
Although, as already observed, the career of Protestant dissenters
had much in common with that of Catholics, unmistakably sharp differences existed. Because of the numerous and varied penalties, Catholics
seemed only infrequently willing to risk their causes in court. After 1829
and 1832, remedial legislation improved this situation; given a place to
put a lever, they tried to remove the burden of their persecution. In this
respect, they followed the tactics of the Protestant dissenters, who also
had appealed more and more often to the courts when they saw the
possibility of a favorable decision. Until 1689, and often after that date,
Protestant dissenters could anticipate no friendly reception at the hands
of the law, but the Toleration Act proved an entering wedge. Catholics
waited 140 years for similar benefits. On the other hand, at times
Catholics, for all their unpopularity with mobs and demagogues, enjoyed less disfavor than Protestant dissenters. The latter were tainted
with republicanism, and during both the Restoration and the Revolutionary era of the eighteenth century they occasionally experienced
bitter hostility.
Yet of course the pendulum swung back and forth. If Catholics looked
less threatening in some periods, the "no-popery" hysteria screamed
2. For some insight into the legal status of Protestant dissenters during thrse year-,
see Mullett, The Legal Position of the English Protestant Dissenters (1936) 22 VA. L. Rvv%
495-526, (1937) 23 id. 389-418, (1939) 25 id. 671-97.
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viciously in the days of the Popish Plot, the Glorious Revolution, the
Jacobite rebellions, and the Gordon Riots. All things considered, furthermore, the laws against popery so heavily weighted the status of
Catholics that they could not even gesture in favor of relief. Protestant
dissenters suffered extensively in all faith, but they were seldom so
completely demoralized that they could not or dared not raise their
voices and organize against persecution. That unfortunately wag too
often the predicament of the Catholics. Some instances were not especially notable, as they followed directly from the laws; others, however,
revealed the fuller meaning of belonging to a persecuted sect. Such items
will be the primary concern in the following pages, and for the sake of
convenience will be grouped roughly according to subject matter, although some account will be taken of chronology.
II
Of all the ways in which Catholics suffered for their religious faith
probably the most persistent hardship resulted from the obstacles placed
in the path of certain charitable legacies. Time and again the highest
courts of England declared the devise of property for the saying of
masses or the benefit of priests a "superstitious use," thus nullifying both
a pious intention and a property right. Sporadically, such judgments
were handed down from the reign of Elizabeth forward.3 An interesting
and clear-cut example of the reasoning and application of this doctrine
is Croft v. Jane Evetts & Auters, which may be briefly summarized.
William, husband of Jane, being a popish recusant' and disliking the
next heir because of the latter's Protestantism, intended to disinherit him
and confer the profits of his lands upon his own fellow religionists
"in trust for the maintenance of superstitious, unlawful and disloyal
3.

Anon., Benl. 30, 73 Eng. Reprints 952 (K. B. 1561); The Dean of St. Paul's Case,

3 Dyer 368a, 73 Eng. Reprints 825 (K. B. 1580) ; Hart v. Brewer and Harrison, Cro. Eliz.
449, 78 Eng. Reprints 688 (K. B. 1595); Adams and Lambert's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 96al
76 Eng. Reprints 1079 (K. B. 1598), 4 Co. Rep. 104 b, 76 Eng. Reprints 1091 (K. B.
1602), Moo. K. B. 648, 72 Eng. Reprints 815 (1602); Pits v. James, Hob. 121, 80 Eng.
Reprints 271 (K. B. 1615); Lancelot v. Allen, Cro. Car. 248, 79 Eng. Reprints 818 (K. B.
1628); Humphrys v. Knight, Cro. Car. 455, 79 Eng. Reprints 994 (K. B. 1632); Waldern
v. Ward, 2 Sid. 46, 82 Eng. Reprints 1248 (K. B. 1657).
4. Moo. K. B. 784, 72 Eng. Reprints 904 (1607).
In Lady Egerton's Case (1605), the
relief of poor recusants was held void, and the court decreed the land to the heir at law
on the ground that the use could not be charitable within the meaning of 43 Eliz. Duxr,
CHAnnTA LE Usas (1676) 133, cited in Bourne v. Keane, [1919] A. C. 815, 846. Cf. Cary
v. Abbott, 7 Ves. Jun. 490, 32 Eng. Reprints 198 (Ch. 1802).
5. For convenience, a recusant may be defined as a person who wilfully absented
himself from the parish church and was therefore penalized under Elizabethan and Jacobean
statutes. Catholics were the usual objects of the phrase.
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uses." To that end an indenture conveyed the lands in question to
some popish recusants and their heirs. It was designed that these persons
would, after the decease of William and Jane, "yearly for ever give,
bestow, and imploy all the issues, revenues and profits of the premises
upon poor Scholars in Oxford & Cambridge, or elsewhere, such as study
and profess or shall hereafter intend to profess and study Divinity."
The Lord Chancellor, conceiving this devise "pernicious and dangerous to the State, and much to concern the present Government and
publick weal of this Land," forbore to make any decree, but ordered
that the deeds and evidences should remain in court. Meanwhile, he
conferred with the judges. After some deliberation, the justices were of
opinion "That all the said Conveyances made upon the hopes, trusts,
confidences and meanings aforesaid, were pernicious and dangerous to
the State of this Common-Wealth. And that if the profits of the Land
should be imployed and bestowed according to the hopes, trusts, and
meanings afore mentioned, the same would be bestowed upon Traitors,
Jesuits, and Seminary Priests and others, being Enemies to the State,
Crown and Dignity of this Kingdom."' Too dangerous to be tolerated,
repugnant to the law, such trusts were unlawful and void. Therefore
the property after Jane's death should go to Croft and his heirs and
assigns forever, and those to whom property had illegally been conveyed
were to release it. Moreover, Jane was not to waste the property then
in her charge.
Throughout the seventeenth century the courts continued to rivet ever
more firmly the bonds of "papists." The arguments varied little, case
by case, although occasionally sufficient deviation warrants attention,
as in a suit of 1693.1 Anne Barlow devised to Lady Portington and her
heirs "absolutely without any trust" for the good of her soul, the property being God's, not Anne's. Could this devise be averred to be in trust
to a superstitious use? The court held that it could not, neither by
statute nor by the nature of the thing. Nevertheless, on an information the Exchequer declared that nothing should be done to propagate
a false religion through a trust to a superstitious use. The statute of 23
Henry VIII, c. 10 (1531) nullified such uses but did not give them to
6. See Croft v. Jane Evetts & Auters, Moo. K. B. 7S4, 7S5, 72 Eng. Reprints 901. 903

(1607).
7. Dominus Rex v. Lady Portington, 1 Salk. 162, 91 Eng. Reprints 151 (K. B. 1693),
3 Salk. 334, 91 Eng. Reprints S56 (K. B. 1693). Different in character but illutrative of

Catholic difficulties was The Queen v. Ride, 3 Salk, 133, 91 Eng. Reprints 733 (K. B.
1705), which held that the wife and executrix of a popish recusant conict could not
prove his will, being disabled by Eliz. c. 4, par. 22. As usual, Salkeld is very incomplete
in his citation, and I am unable to determine the statute.
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the king.' Because the use was "merely void" and because, though her
purpose was bad, Anne was competent to devise her property away
from her kin, the property should not now go to the heir at law. Therefore, the king should apply-it to a "proper use."
Meanwhile, an equally oppressive series of judgments had revealed
another aspect of legal disability for Catholics. As in the matter of
"superstitious uses," the statute specified the crime, but nonetheless the
courts were frequently faced with the need for applying it in a harsh
fashion. In 1605, Parliament, in order "to prevent and avoid dangers
which grow by popish recusants," enacted, among other articles, that
no recusant should present to a benefice.' England was divided into two
regions, in one of which the chancellor and scholars of Oxford, in the
other the chancellor and scholars of Cambridge, should present, so long
as the patron remained a recusant. Some ten years later, two suits, one
for each region, came into court to clinch this legislation.1" Why such a
lapse of time occurred is impossible to say. Perhaps, the statute was
less clear to contemporaries than to later students; perhaps, the desire
to take advantage of the act was not very pronounced among the rank
and file of Englishmen. In any instance, the delay is not without interest.
In the Oxford case, it appeared that a John Draicot, seised of the
manor of Draicot, to which the advowson of the church was appendant
in fee, had granted by deed the next avoidance of the church to a
George Eyre. After Draicot's death, the manor and advowson descended
to another John Draicot, cousin and heir of the former, who was indicted both for not receiving the sacrament and not attending church.
The plaintiffs maintained that, because the second Draicot was a popish
recusant convict, the grant was void, that the chancellor and scholars of
Oxford had the right to present, and that the defendants disturbed them.
8. The statute, 1 Edw. VI, c. 14 (1547), gave such uses to the king but did not extend
to future cases.
9. 3 Jac. I, c. 5 (1605). The phrase, "present to a benefice," as well as the words,
"advowson" and "avoidance", which will be used below, perhaps call for some definition.
A "benefice" was an ecclesiastical living. Technically, it meant one to which a rank
or office was attached; practically, the term applied to rectories, vicarages, etc. "To present" was to offer a clerk to the bishop to be instituted in the benefice. "Advowson"
was the right of presentation to a benefice; this right belonged to certain manors or
parsons, and the individual possessed of the right was a "patron". "Avoidance" was the
condition of a benefice when it had no incumbent. So: when an avoidancc occurred in a
benefice, the patron to whom the advowson belonged had the right to present.
10. The Case of the Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars of the University of Oxford,
10 Co. Rep. 53b, 77 Eng. Reprints 1006 (K. B. 1613); Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars
of Cambridge v. Walgrave, Hob. 126, g0 Eng. Reprints 275 (K. B. 1616). Another Instance of loss of advowson through conviction of recusancy came to light In Duncombe
v. University of Oxford, Winch 11, 124 Eng. Reprints 10 (C. P. 1620).
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The latter replied that the grant preceded any conviction for recusancy.
To this the court responded, "after the said John Draicot was a popish
recusant convict, during the time that he remains a recusant, he now
shall be disabled to grant any next avoidance, by the retrospect of the
Act after the beginning of the said session of Parliament, and the makers
of the Act intended to inflict greater disability upon them who became
popish recusants, after the damnable and damned powder treason, than
11
before."
The Cambridge case differed sufficiently to warrant a brief resum6
of it here. The chancellor, masters, and scholars of Cambridge claimed
the presentation of the church of Colny, because Yaxley, patron of the
church at the avoidance by the death of the last incumbent, was a popish
recusant convict. To this Walgrave replied that although a popish convict, Yaxley was seised of the manor at the time of his conviction, on
which occasion the commissioners had taken two parts of the manor for
the king who in turn had devised these to Wagrave. In removing the
incumbent, the court established the principle-in effect for many generations-that where two patrons, one Protestant, the other Catholic,
controlled an advowson, the Protestant should present.
Nearly a century elapsed before this cause again came into court.
"No-Popery" had proven a rallying cry throughout the greater part of
the seventeenth century, but the Toleration Act of 1689 and the apparent
decline in bigotry may have encouraged a test over presentation. The
facts differed but little from those already related, and the result varied
not at all.' In the argument, it was specified that every person convicted
of recusancy was disabled from presenting to any benefice. No difference existed whether the person was convicted before or after the avoidance occurred. Three decades later, another suit had some significance
in the same issue.13 The plaintiff, while a papist, had assigned an advowson to the defendant for ninety-nine years. In bringing suit he contended
that he had only assigned it in trust for himself in order to avoid the
penalties of 3 Jac. I, c. 5 (1605), and the amplifying statute, 1 Will.
& Mar. c. 26 (1689). The alleged trust was not in writing. The plaintiff
had now renounced the Catholic faith and had become a "good protestant." The court, awarding judgment to the plaintiff, concluded that the
11. The Case of the Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars of the University of Oxford,
10 Co. Rep. 53b, 56a, 77 Eng. Reprints 1006, 1009 (K. B. 1613).
12. Fitzherhert v. Oxford University, 1 Com. 181, 92 Eng. Reprints 1024 (K. B. 170).
In Thurston v. Slatford, 1 Salk. 284, 91 Eng. Reprints 251 (K. B. 17C), which concerncd
an action to oust the plaintiff from his office of the clerk of the peace of Oxfor&hira
because he had not taken his oath of office, the court adverted to the voidance of prczntation on the ground of conviction for recusancy.
13. Cottington v. Fletcher, 2 Atk. 155, 26 Eng. Reprints 498 (Ch. 1740).
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acts of "papists" were purged upon their conformity to the Protestant
religion. Such conformists were freed and discharged from any penalties
and losses which they might otherwise sustain in respect of their recusancy.
During the remaining years of the century Catholic suits arose but
seldom, a sharp contrast to the history of Protestant nonconformity.
Protestant dissenters constantly appealed to litigation, probably because
they found the courts generous-more generous, indeed, than Parliament. Catholics found the courts firmly intent on not only retaining
but even increasing the bonds; rather oddly, they received more concessions from Parliament than did their Protestant brethren. 14 Moreover, regardless of the bitter feeling during the Gordon Riots, Catholics
soon aroused less fear than the Protestant dissenters." When the Catholic Church was suffering confiscation and humiliation at the hands of the
French Jacobins, it enjoyed greater prestige and favor in the eyes of
many Englishmen who feared lest English Jacobins follow French precedent in attacking the Established Church. Prestige and favor, however,
were but relative, and the law granted no equality to Catholics. From
the standpoint of their devotions they had materially improved their
status; as members of a state they were still a persecuted minority. They
might worship in their own way without immediate hindrance; nevertheless, so ran much contemporary reasoning, if they were sufficiently perverse to want to worship that way, they must be prepared to accept the
consequences, namely, a large measure of outlawry.
This point of view was consistently exemplified by the courts. In
1793, a woman by a codicil to her will gave legacies to several Catholic
institutions in England and elsewhere." These were considered void:
14. "An Act for relieving his Majesty's Subjects professing the Popish Religion from
certain penalties and disabilities. . . .", 1777, 18 Geo. III, c. 60; "An Act to relieve, upon
conditions, and under restrictions, the persons therein described, from certain penalties
and disabilities to which Papists, or persons professing the popish religion, are by law
subject", 1790, 31 Geo. III, c. 32. Chiefly, these acts improved the property rights of
Catholics. removed restrictions on personal liberty, and conceded a substantial amount of
freedom of worship.
15. In 1780, the Bishop of Derry favored a "seasonable indulgence" to both "Papists"
and Presbyterians, of whom the latter were more dangerous to society as being "more

truly republican". I Stopford-Sackville MSS. 250 [HIsT. Mss. Commar. REP. (1904)]. In
1791, Pitt regretted that the Catholics had applied for relief because their application
would be "improperly confounded with the question of the Dissenters. This, however,
is no good reason against the Catholics. . . ." II Fortescue MSS. 13 [XIV HIST. Mss.
Corm. REP., pt. v. (1894)].
16. See 28 PAr.LIAMENTARY HISTORY 1262-69, 1364-76; 29 id. 113-19, 664-83; II Fortescue
MSS. 89, 237.
17. De Garcin v. Lawson, 4 Ves. 433n (Ch. 1789).
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those to foreign countries as contrary to English policy, those to English
beneficiaries as illegal. A little later, the court of chancery held void the
disposal of property at the discretion of a religious superior.'
In 1802, the same court disallowed a residuary bequest for bringing
up poor children in the Catholic faith."' The other beneficiaries filed a
bill to set aside this bequest and to have the testator declared intestate
as to the residue which would then pass to them. It was replied that
the common assumption concerning the forfeiture of property devised
to a superstitious use could not be maintained upon the statute20 When
the devise was to a superstitious use and voided by statute, or to a charity
and voided by the Statute of Mortmain,2 1 it should go to the heir at law.
On the other hand, when the devise was to a charity but the mode
promoted a religion contrary to the established one, the crown might
by sign manual give orders in what charitable way the devise should be
disposed. The plaintiffs, however, argued that such a disposition completely departed from the testator's intention, and that by the Statute
of Mortmain his disposition of the property was absolutely void. Therefore, the court could not give it effect. In his decision, the Master of
the Rolls carefully weighed the arguments. Although, he said, Catholics
had no lawful right to devise property for educating children in their
faith, "authorities without number" had concluded that, when a testator
was disposed to be charitable upon his own principles, the courts should
not disappoint even while disapproving his intention. The court would
not overturn the settled law and practice according to which charitable
bequests void as to one object might be appropriated to another. No
statute made superstitious uses void generally; the pertinent statutes
had a particular or temporary application. The use being superstitious
was void, but not so far void that it should go to the heir. Bequests
charitable in their nature should be applied to charities. Although the
present residuary bequest was void, it should go to such charitable use
as the king directed.
This case has considerable interest, for it became a signpost in many
later decisions. Although in a narrow sense it bears out Dicey's contention that even prior to 1778 judges and juries "threw every difficulty
in the way of informers who proceeded against Roman Catholics for
penalties", 2 it had the vicious effect of amplifying earlier steps in the
Smart v. Prujean, 6 Ves. 560, 31 Eng. Reprints 1195 (Ch. 1801).
Cary v. Abbot, 7 Ves. 490, 32 Eng. Reprints 193 (Ch. 1802).
1 Edw. VI, c. 14 (1547).
9 Geo. II, c. 36 (1735).
LW AN Punlc Opro.n
22. Dicny, LmcuaREs oN RLArTiozz BETrrs
Nn=raaNr.
CmnTuRy (1905) 80n.
18.
19.
20.
21.

DUfl

Tim
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direction of the doctrine of cy pres. This doctrine, which had in essence
characterized the decision, already noted, in Dominus Rex v. Lady
2
Portington, and had also appeared in the case, Da Costa v. De Pas, 3
proved to have most absurd, not to say unjust, consequences, since it
permitted the king to disregard the wishes of the testator by malting
the latter support a charity completely repugnant to him.
Not long after Cary v. Abbot the Irish Chancery likewise considered
the issue in a case worth recounting.2 4 A Mrs. Power, by will dated
May 25, 1804, bequeathed £9332 to two Catholic bishops and to their
successors forever, in trust (amongst others) to apply the interest of
£2000 in clothing such poor children educated in the school of the nunnery at Waterford, to lay out the sum of £1000 for the purchase or
building of a house in Waterford for twelve "reduced gentlewomen,"
and to use the interest of £1000 for the support and the education of
poor boys, to be nominated and appointed by the said trustees and their
successors forever. In May, 1807, an information charged the trustees
with legal incapacity, denied the legality of some of the trusts, and
prayed for the appointment of new trustees and the devotion of the
funds to legitimate charitable purposes. The relators maintained that
no such corporate characters as a Catholic bishop and his successors
were known to Irish law. A bequest to them was void. Likewise a
bequest to endow a Catholic school was void by statute; 25 moreover,
as a superstitious use it was void by Cary v. Abbot. The same objection
applied to the £1000 for the education of poor boys. Against this it
23. In Da Costa v. De Pas, Amb. 228, 27 Eng. Reprints 150 (Ch. 1754), the court,
arguing that where a devise promoted a religion contrary to the Establishment, the crown
shall give it to a proper charity, applied a legacy for instructing Jews to a Christian
Foundling Hospital. The bequest was good, the use was bad.
The doctrine of cy pres has recently been analysed by ScoTt, Tm LAW or TRUsTs (1939)
2098-2103. He emphasizes its prerogative as well as its judicial character, especially In
connection with those cases "where property was given for a purpose which was illegal
but which except for such illegality would be charitable." The prerogative doctrine gave
the crown the right to apply the property to any charity it might select, on the theory
that the purpose of the testator being charitable, he would have applied his bequest to
the second end, had he known that the first was impossible. Applying a Jewish bequest
to Christian beneficiaries shows the perverted nature of such reasoning, and Catholic cases
greatly enlarged the moral. Significantly but not influentially, Wilmot pointed out the
vicious consequences of Da Costa v. De Pas in Attorney-General v. Downing, Amb. 50,
27 Eng. Reprints 353 (Ch. 1766), Wilm. 1, 97 Eng. Reprints 1 (K. B. 1767), where he
said that had he not been bound by authority, he would, in a case of this sort, have
been inclined to hold for the next of kin; no testator should be made to support a charity
repugnant to him. However, he felt the doctrine too firmly settled to go counter to It.
24. Attorney-General v. Power, 1 Ball & B. 145 (Ir. Ch. 1809).
25. 21 & 22 Geo. III, c. 62 (1781).
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was argued that if the defendants could not take in a corporate capacity,
they still might take as individuals, and that since the relaxing laws,
the establishment of schools was not to be deemed a superstitious use,
and the bequest contravened no law.
In his judgment the Lord Chancellor displayed a larger and more
generous spirit than that exemplified in many earlier cases. He declared
that the trustees might act in a qualified manner, but upon their death
(or of either of them) the trust would devolve upon the chancery which
did not recognize them in a corporate capacity. The bequest to the
school would be void in England by the statute, 1 Edw. VIT, c. 14
(1547) which did not extend to Ireland, or as against public policy.
The statute, 7 Will. III, c. 4, sec. 9 (1695), while not creating the
offense, penalized Catholics for keeping schools. Other laws strongly
declared the assumption that Catholic schools were illegal, as in England. The trust for the education of the poor boys would cause no
difficulty if the trustees made no distinction between Catholic and
Protestant boys. Otherwise, the trust would be looked into. The English
Mortmain Act, 1735, 9 Geo. II, c. 36, would render void the bequest
for reduced gentlewomen, if Ireland were under that law. Since this
act did not apply, the bequest was not declared void, though its legality
was by no means absolutely settled. Although the decision here gave
Catholics no immediate hope, the temper of the case, like that of Cary
v. Abbot, showed no tendency to push the letter of the law to the farthest
extreme. Nevertheless, the predicament of Catholics in such matters
as that under dispute revealed a large measure of persecution which only
legislation could abolish. In that sense litigation had unmistakable value.
In England, litigious activity after Cary v. Abbot lapsed for over a
quarter of a century, but in 1828 a court declared against the legality
of Catholic charities whose particular purpose was to promote the circulation of a treatise upholding the supremacy of the pope, and which
therefore reverted to the donor.20 The following year, however, legis2lation achieved the prior place of interest. The Emancipation Act T
removed many oppressive political burdens and relieved Catholics in
some measure of their outlawry. Yet, the act was by no means comprehensive, and three years later additional legislation attempted to
settle some problems created by the Emancipation Act, particularly in
the matter of charities. 28 This latter statute in turn stimulated extensive
litigation.
26. De Themmines v. De Bonneval, S Russ. 288, 38 Eng. Reprints 1035 (Ch. 1823).
27. 10 Geo. IV, c. 7 (1829).

2S. "An Act for the better securing the charitable Donations and Bequests of his
Majesty's Subjects in Great Britain professing the Roman Catholic Religion," 1831, 2 & 3
Will. IV, c. 115.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 9

III

The first case following the legislation was Bradshaw v. Tasker.'
Bradshaw, who died in 1823, had in his will, dated 1820, bequeathed
£500 to two Catholic schools. A bill, filed on behalf of the infant heir
of Bradshaw, prayed that the legacies might be declared void and the
sums added to the residuary personal estate. To complicate the situation, section three of the act, 2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 115 (1832), "for the
better securing the charitable donations and bequests of his Majesty's
Roman Catholic subjects in Great Britain," provided that nothing in
the act should affect any suit actually commenced or pending, or any
property in litigation. The plaintiff argued that before the act a bequest
for the benefit of a Catholic school was unlawful. Were the legacies
absolutely void, thus falling into the residue, or did the act recently
passed operate retrospectively? Supposing the latter to be true, were
not these legacies governed by the section against affecting a suit pending
or property in litigation? Lord Chancellor Brougham "was of opinion
that the act was retrospective; and that, as the trustees of the school
[Tasker was a trustee] were not litigant parties in the suit, which was
a mere suit for the administration of the testator's estate, the case did
not fall within the exception in the third section of the act." The legacies
should go to the trustees of the schools.
Fundamentally similar in many ways was West v. Shuttleworth.30 A
testatrix directed payment of several sums to certain Catholic beneficiaries as soon as possible after her decease so that she might have the
benefit of their prayers and masses. She also gave the residue of her
estate to trustees to pay specified sums for prayers for the repose of
her soul and that of her deceased husband, and to promote the Catholic
religion among certain poor and ignorant people. Anne West, the
residuary legatee, filed the bill against the surviving executor. The court
held that the gifts to priests and chapels were void and should go to
the next of kin, but that the gift of the residue was valid within the
recent Charities Act. Because this case dictated the trend of decisions
for nearly a century, additional attention to its pleas and arguments
seems warranted.
The plaintiff argued that if the legacies were void and no charitable
purpose was indicated, the next of kin would be entitled to the benefit
of the failure. The gifts to priests and chapels were to a superstitious
use and consequently void, either by 1 Edw. VI, c. 14 (1547), or as
against the policy of the law. Moreover, these indicated no charitable
29.

2 My. & K. 221, 39 Eng. Reprints 928 (Ch. 1834).

30.

2 My. & K. 684, 39 Eng. Reprints 1106 (Ch. 1835).
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purpose. The gift for the promotion of knowledge of the Catholic religion, for propagating a religion other than that of the state, was equally
void as contrary to the policy of the law. The defendant maintained
that the gifts to the priests and chapels were in the nature of rewards
for services to be performed and that no ground existed for supposing
the prayers and masses were to be said in perpetuity. These gifts were
void neither by the statute of Edward nor by virtue of running contrary
to the general policy of the law. Cary v. Abbot held that no statute
made superstitious uses void generally; the act of Edward applied only
to superstitious uses of a particular kind then in existence. Moreover,
the contest now made was for the testatrix's personal estate, whereas
the statute specified real property. Although the residuary bequest might
once have been held void, it was now, under the relief act of 1791 and
the Charities Act, which Lord Brougham had held retrospective, perfectly
valid.
Supposing that the present bequest, if made in behalf of Protestant
dissenters, could be proved valid, it must be valid as regards Catholics.
In Attorney-General v. Pearson,3 Lord Eldon had no doubt that the
court should carry into execution a fund, real or personal, to maintain
a society of Protestant dissenters, promoting no illegal doctrines although
at variance with Anglican tenets. The doctrines of Catholics no more
contravened the law than those of any class of Protestant dissenters;
if a bequest for the latter was good, so was one for the Catholics. In
qualification of this stand, however, one attorney insisted that, in removing doubts concerning the right of Catholics to acquire and hold
property necessary for religious worship, education, and charitable purposes, the legislature had not intended that the Charities Act should
change the whole policy of the law as it applied to doctrines other than
those of the established church and sanction the unlimited propagation
of the Catholic religion.
The plaintiff rejoined that the gifts for the purpose of obtaining prayers and masses could not be considered as gifts for a temporary service:
the testatrix intended these to continue as long as her soul might remain
in purgatory; her bequest was "a gift for a purpose in its nature superstitious, and void, therefore, as contrary to the policy of the law," irrespective of Edward's act. Furthermore, the residuary legacy sought to
promote the Catholic faith at the expense of others. This bequest would
be unlawful, whether the beneficiaries were Jews, Presbyterians, Catholics, or any other dissentients from the established religion. Since it
indicated no charitable purpose but one contrary to the policy of the
31.

3 Mer. 353, 36 Eng. Reprints 135 (Ch. 1817).
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law, the bequest failed altogether, and the next of kin should receive
the residuary estate.
The Master of the Rolls, after reviewing the arguments, considered
first the gift of the residue. Since the property was not in litigation upon
the point contended for, in 1832, no consideration of the law concerning
the disposition of property in favor of Catholics prior to that time, was
necessary. What is the law in favor of Protestant dissenters, and thus
of Catholics, now? Bradshaw v. Tasker"2 did not help because a gift
to certain Catholic schools differed in principle from promoting the
Catholic religion among the poor and ignorant. On the other hand,
Attorney-General v. Pearson sustained funds to promote doctrines not
illegal; and since the court had favored legacies to dissenters the gift
of the residue was valid here. The legacies to the priests and chapels
were not affected by the Charities Act, because the testatrix intended
them not for the priests personally but for the benefit of her soul and
that of her late husband. Could such legacies be supported? Even if
they were not within the terms of Edward's statute, many cases showed
such legacies to be among the superstitious uses which that act intended
to suppress. What should be done with them? Since they were void not
by statute but on account of the general illegality of their object, the
property did not go to the king. Had these bequests been charitable,
the doctrine of cy pres would hold. The gifts were void because illegal;
since neither the Chantry Act nor cy pres gave the crown a claim, the
property went to the next of kin.
The importance of this decision is comprehended only when it is
remembered that until 1919 it governed all such bequests. In that year,
Bourne v. Keane3 overturned West v. Shuttleworth 4 and sustained such
legacies as these referred to. Even then, however, one member of the
court thought it undesirable to run counter to West v. Shuttleworth
and the opinions based on it. During the eighty-five years intervening
between these two cases, as we shall see, several important decisions
extended the judgment of West v. Shuttleworth which became a bulwark
for those who would penalize Catholics. The case revealed also what is
easily overlooked, namely, that of itself relief legislation was often
woefully inadequate and so porous as to leave many loopholes for men
to snipe at the adherents of a nonconforming faith. The Emancipation
Act of 1829 has-and justly-received great attention and praise; to
appreciate the full story, however, students must look into such neglected
pages as those of West v. Shuttleworth.
32.
33.
34.

2 My. & K. 221, 39 Eng. Reprints 928 (Ch. 1834).
[19191 A. C. 815.
2 My. & K. 684, 39 Eng. Reprints 1106 (Ch. 1835).
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Two years later, the court of chancery nullified another will.P In
1680, a testatrix requested that a farm be let to some deserving Catholic
who would minister to poor Catholics. The court now held these instructions illegal and void, partly on the convenient ground that at the
beginning of this suit the Charities Act of 1832 had not been passed.
Notwithstanding this ruling, the priest was awarded an annual grant
of £20; it not being clear, however, whether this concession was regarded
as legally due or as an indirect protest against the law as it then stood.
In 1839, an historically interesting case began its two year career in
the courts, not the least of its engaging facets being the interpretation
of a will dated 15136 In that year, Sir Thomas Kneseworth devised
lands to the Fishmongers' Company to secure prayers for the good of
his soul. The Chantry Act provided that all such lands should be enjoyed
by the king, but questions later arose as to whether the act vested the
land itself or only the annual payments as rent charges in the crown.
Accordingly in 1550, by Letters Patent between the crown and the
Fishmongers' Company and other companies similarly situated, the
companies purchased the rent charges to which the crown had or was
supposed to have become entitled. Some indecision still remaining, a
private statute, 4 Jac. I, c. 10 (1606), confirmed the hereditaments to
the said companies forever without rent. In 1833, the Attorney-General
sought to have Kneseworth's trusts declared charitable and to be carried
into effect by the court.
The defendants, maintaining that virtually all the payments were
directed to superstitious uses, claimed to have performed the only charitable purpose by applying considerable parts of the income to ends
more or less specified in the will. This they did from pious regard, not
from obligation. The plaintiff replied that the obits alone came within
Edward's act; the other bequests were valid, to be carried into effect
cy pres by the court. The defendants by their conduct had admitted the
estate to be subject to charitable trusts. Edward's statute sought not
to overthrow works of charity, but to remove the abuse; the statute of
James supported this view. In return, the defendants emphasized the
company's title to the rents and grants which had been confirmed by
James. The testator had intended the company to take some part by
making it liable to a penalty for default in the performance of the trust.
Because the gifts were superstitious the statute deemed the king in
35. The Attorney-General v. Todd, 1 Keen S03, 4S Eng. Reprints 516 (Rols 1836-37).
36. The Attorney-General v. The Fishmongers' Company (Kneseworth's Charity), 2 Beav.
151, 48 Eng. Reprints 1137 (Rolls 1839). A case somewhat imilar to this was The
Attorney-General v. The Cordwainers' Company, 3 Bly. & K. 534, 40 Eng. Reprints 203
(Ch. 1833).
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actual possession; therefore, the doctrine of cy pres had no validity.
Even if the company had devoted part of the income to charity, it had
assumed complete freedom of disposal.
The Master of the Rolls agreed that James's statute had vested in
the Fishmongers' Company such lands or interests as the crown was
entitled to by Edward's statute. Were any of Kneseworth's trusts good
charitable trusts which had been violated by the defendants? Foundations securing prayers for the souls of the dead were superstitious within
the statute of Edward VI; the directions of the will were such that
payments made in respect thereof became the property of the crown.
Prayers for the souls of the dead had never been deemed superstitious,
but to endow a foundation in perpetuity for securing such prayers might
be deemed superstitious. All the estates became the property of the
company.
In a parallel suit, differing slightly in detail, the relators sought to
impeach the company's title to absolute ownership and to make the
company only a trustee. The defendant again received judgment. In
1840-41, both cases were carried on appeal to the Lord Chancellor who
held that the Letters Patent of Edward and the statute of James gave
the company all the interests in the property to which the crown became,
or might have become, entitled to by Edward's act, subject to no trust
whatever; in any case he could not establish charities made illegal by
that statute.37 In the second suit, the relators had to pay the cost of
the appeal, and the Lord Chancellor sharply condemned their lamentable
carelessness in not investigating the facts before making an impossible
appeal.
In 1839, Catholics had their first advowson test in a century. 88 The
plaintiff and Knight, a Catholic, were seised of an advowson in equal
moieties. When the living fell vacant, the plaintiff presented a fit person
whom the defendants refused to accept because Knight had not joined
in the presentation and because they had no notice of his faith. The
court decided that where a Protestant and a Catholic were co-patrons,
the right of presentation lay in the Protestant alone. The statutes only
intended to keep the Catholic from presenting, and any other interpretation would penalize the Protestant co-patron. To transfer to the universities the power to present, when not all the co-patrons were disabled,
would be a casus omissus in the statute. In this respect, the status of
Catholics had not improved since 1615, regardless of the relief acts,
37. The Attorney-General v. The Fishmongers' Company (Preston's Will), 2 Beav.
588, 48 Eng. Reprints (Rolls 1839), 5 My. & Cr. 11, 41 Eng, Reprints 276 (Ch. 1841).
38. Edwards v. The Bishop of Exeter, 5 Bing. N. C. 652, 132 Eng. Reprints 1251
(C. P. 1839), 6 Bing. N. C. 146, 133 Eng. Reprints 57 (C. P. 1839).
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and after such assurance as given here they did not raise the issue again
for over half a century.
The year 1842 brought a contest over legacies of £15,000 to the use
of Catholic priests in and near London, of £2,000 for a Catholic chapel,
and others similar in nature." At the instance of several priests an
information prayed that the £15,000 might be invested and secured, its
charitable use established, and its regulation and disposal settled, since
the testator intended the legacy, a charitable one, as a permanent endowment for the support of Catholic clergy in and near London. The defendant, one of the trustees, argued that the testator wished to benefit
specific Catholic priests and not their successors. The Vice-Chancellor
agreed with the relators. The phrase, "for the use thereof," must "be
construed as importing perpetuity;" the gift to the chapel sustained
this view. Where the testator meant a precise person, he so stated.
The legacy of £15,000 was a charitable use.
Twelve years later, a similar issue occupied the courts.4 0 A testator
bequeathed annuities to churches in Italy and England for masses and
requiems. Since such bequests contravened the spirit of English law, the
testator transferred the stock in his own lifetime to trustees to carry
out his intentions. Although it was argued that gifts for such prayers
were not illegal, the residuary legatees insisted that the Charities Act
of William IV 4 had only put Catholics on the same footing as Protestant
dissenters. It did not make a use which was superstitious cease to be so.
Gifts for masses and requiems were void. In his decision, the ViceChancellor primarily considered whether the uses and purposes of the
donor were void as superstitious. Before William's act, such were superstitious and void, and the property went to the crown. What did the
statute accomplish? If it meant to alter the law it was singularly inapt.
Actually it put the Catholics on a footing with the Protestant dissenters.
Property given for a place of worship but not for superstitious uses was
lawful. Since the present uses were superstitious the only question
concerned the recipient. No charity being involved, the residuary legatees
and not the crown were the beneficiaries.
In 1861, the same hardy perennial required settlement 2 Blundell in
39. The Attorney-General v. Gladstone, 13 Sir. 7, Co Eng. Rcprints 3 (V. C. 1942).
Two years later, 1844, an act, 7 & 3 Vict. c. 102, repealed certain penal enactments ranging
from the reigns of Edward VI to William and Mary.
40. Heath v. Chapman, 2 Drew. 417, 61 Eng. Reprints 781 (V. C. 1854). By Breeks
v. Woolfrey, 1 Curt. 880, 163 Eng. Reprints 304 (Ecc. 183S), such gifts for prayers were
held not contrary to Church of England doctrine.
41.

2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 115 (1832).

42. In re Blundell's Trusts, 30 Beav. 360, 54 Eng. Reprints 928 (Rolls 1861).
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1807 had transferred £1000 into the names of three specified trustees
(whose successors were provided for) to distribute the income to priests
of specific chapels on condition of celebrating masses for the repose of
Blundell's soul. If these priests failed, the trustees should pay the
appropriate funds to priests willing to comply. The dividends were paid
for many years but in 1861 the trustee, being advised that doubts existed
as to the validity of the trusts, paid the fund into court. Priests of four
chapels declared their willingness to comply with the terms and requested
payment. The Master of the Rolls, stating his obligation to follow
West v. Shuttlewortk, held the trust void and ordered the fund paid to
the representative of the founder: the House of Lords alone could alter
the law..
In re Metcalfe's Trusts4 3 was another variation on this theme. A Miss
Thompson became a Catholic and a nun in 1858; in 1862 she conveyed
and assigned all her property to X and Y upon trust for the benefit
of an Oratory at Brompton; all future acquisitions would be conveyed
to the same men for the same purpose. After this, Metcalfe left her
some property. She petitioned that this be given to X and Y, but her
action was opposed on the ground that a nun being civilly dead was
incapable of taking property, and many cases were cited to support this
contention. Nevertheless, the court, after considering whether or not a
nun was capable of inheriting and assigning property, declared Miss
Thompson to possess legal capacity of owning and transferring land.
The hostile precedents-with the irrelevant exception, Rex v. Lady
Portington4 4 -occurred before the Reformation; no cases afterward
denied a nun's right to inherit and convey property.
In Cocks v. Manners,45 a testatrix bequeathed the residue of her property, consisting of pure and impure personalty, to four Catholic institutions. The Vice-Chancellor held the bequest to a community of sisters,
a voluntary, charitable institution, good as to the pure personalty, and
the bequest to a Dominican convent good as to both pure and impure
personalty. "Religious purposes are charitable," he decided, "only when
religious services tend directly or indirectly towards the instruction or
edification of the public."
Although these two cases seemed to indicate a trend in favor of
Catholic property rights, evidence was not long in coming to show that
preceding year had seen the passage of another Charities Act, 1860, 23 & 24 Vict. c. 134,
but it was not sufficiently powerful to change the ruling of West v. Shuttleworth.
43. 2 De G. J. & S. 122, 46 Eng. Reprints 321 (Ch. 1864).
44. 1 Salk. 162, 91 Eng. Reprints 151 (K. B. 1693), 3 Salk. 334, 91 Eng. Reprints 856
(K. B. 1693).
45. L. R. 12 Eq. 574 (1871).
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certain bequests were still void as illegal. In re Flectwood0 declared
a gift for masses void. A decade later, the court annulled a legacy to a
superstitious use, given by a testator domiciled in England, even though
the legatee resided abroad where such a legacy was good:17 The testator,
a domiciled Englishman, bequeathed to the Society of Jesus at R.,
Victoria, Australia, 11000 to be spent in masses. The court held that
the legacy, being void in England, did not become legal through the
legatees' domicile in Victoria, where it would be valid. On another occasion, a residuary bequest, given in trust for the Catholic Archbishop of
Westminster for the time being to be distributed between various charitable, religious, and other societies, institutions, or persons of the
Catholic faith in England as he saw fit, was held void.4 s Uncertainty,
however, rather than religion seemed to determine the judgment inasmuch as the executors expressly sought to discover whether this was a
good charitable bequest.
In 1914, the issue again called for settlement 19 Erasmus Smith devised his property, less certain expenses, to trustees to hold the residue
in trust for "the Franciscan Friars of Clevedon." The plaintiffs, who
were the executor, executrix, and trustees, questioned the validity of
the trust as contrary to the Relief Act of 1829, of which the pertinent
section recited the expediency of suppressing "Jesuits, and members of
other Religious orders, Communities, or Societies of the Church of
Rome, bound by monastic or religious vows, resident within the United
Kingdom." The law further provided that natural born Jesuits might
return to the kingdom and be registered. The court held the will valid:
the sections relied on "have never been enforced. They are, as they
have been from the first, and no doubt remain, a dead letter." Taken
in their widest possible sense, they did not place the defender, "even if
and when convicted, in the position of an outlaw; or disqualify him
from taking, by conveyance or assignment inter vivos or by will, or
from holding any property, even real estate, in this country." By the
law a person becoming a Jesuit was guilty at the most of a misdemeanor.
A felon was no longer disqualified as to holding property; how then
could one guilty of a misdemeanor be disqualified? While some Irish
cases had held that an unincorporated society could not take property,
Irish cases upon the whole were far from satisfactory and need not be
followed. The bequest in question was "a gift to the several members
of the community of Franciscan Friars at Clevedon upon a simple imme46. 15 Ch.D. 594 (1880).
47. It re Elliott, 39 W. R. 297 (1891).
43. In re Davidson, [19093 1 Ch. 567.
49. In re Smith, [1914) 1 Ch. 937.
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diate absolute bequest of individuals ascertained at the death of the
testator."
In 1917, the Chancery settled a dispute over a bequest by a testatrix
to the trustees of her will, to pay the income for life to her nephew
when he should have attained the age of 24 years, provided that he
should not be a Catholic at her death or being a Catholic at her death
should cease to be so before the expiration of a year. 0 The nephew was
only 9 years old when the testatrix died. He had been baptized in a
Roman Catholic Church and brought up by his father in that faith. The
court held that the nephew had not forfeited the legacy as the testatrix
intended him to make a choice which he could not do until he reached
years of discretion. In the eye of the court an infant was incapable of
being a Catholic or not a Catholic.
In 1919, Bourne v. Keane"' strikingly reversed the law of bequests
for masses by deciding that such a bequest of personal estate was not
void as a gift to superstitious uses. Before discussing that revolution,
it may be well to bring together the scattered suits of other application
during the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This litigation,
lacking uniformity and defying classification, revealed nonetheless the
manifold ways in which Catholics might have their religion flaunted,
their social status circumscribed, and their individual rights invaded.
If the issues were on the whole less significant than those touching bequests, the implicit persecution appeared very clearly.
IV
The Earl of Shrewsbury v. Scott 2 recalled a more intolerant age. In
1700, the then Earl of Shrewsbury made a settlement of his lands, etc.
At that period, persons professing the Catholic religion, unless they took
certain oaths and subscribed a specific declaration within six months
of attaining the age of eighteen years, were incapable of inheriting, and
the property would go to the Protestant next of kin. Under the will of
a former owner the plaintiff was now entitled to the land in question
until something disentitled him. The court held, however, that the plaintiff, a Catholic, having done nothing to remove the penalties of the act,
could not take the land. The Relief Act of 1829 did not remove this
disability.
Four years later a pleasant, albeit a minor contrast to hostile deci50. In re May, [1917] 2 Ch. 126.
51. [1919] A. C. 815.
52. 6 C. B. N. S. 221, 141 Eng. Reprints 437 (1860). In 1867, this situation was
improved by an act abolishing the declaration against transubstantiation and other devotional ceremonies. 30 & 31 Vict. c. 62.
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sions occurred. To sustain her plea of coverture, the defendant swore
marriage by a priest in 1844 in a Catholic chapel to a Catholic a The
plaintiff sought to prove the marriage not solemnized in a registered
place of worship as required by a recent act, 6 and 7 William IV, c. 85
(1836), but the court declared the legality of the marriage.
Quite different in character from these disputes was The Quecn v.
Haslehurstk4 The Poor Law empowered overseers and guardians to
employ requisite paid workers to superintend the administration of the
relief and employment of the poor, but no workers should be compelled
to attend any services contrary to the religious beliefs. In this instance
a Catholic clergyman was appointed for those of that belief, yet payments to him were disallowed by the auditor. The court held that since
the guardian could lawfully provide religious services for the different
workers, he could appoint and pay persons to hold such services. The
phrase, "officers to superintend", included ministers of different religious
beliefs. It was competent, therefore, of the guardians to appoint and
pay a Roman Catholic clergyman to minister to the religious wants of
the Roman Catholic inmates of the workhouse.
In 1891, Petre v. Ferrers" brought a different instance into court.
The Petres, an old Catholic family, years before had a bishop consecrate
an altar in their mansion where it was used only for worship. The lessee
of the mansion, now the defendant, gave the altar to a bishop. Previously,
the house had ceased to be used as a place of worship. The defendant
claimed that his action accorded with church law and that when the
status of the house changed, the title to the altar passed to the bishop.
In rejecting this plea, the court held church law no part of the common
law and ordered the return of the altar.
The year 1892 saw the reappearance of the advowson issue.l Boyer,
nominated by Sir Alexander Dixie to a vacant rectory, was in all respects
qualified for the position. Because Sir Alexander was a Catholic, the
Bishop of Norwich refused to accept the nomination under the statute
which read, "Every Papist is hereby incapable to present to any benefice."
Although Sir Alexander was the heir to one who had formerly had the
right to present, and although he had the necessary education and other
requirements, the statute made him ineligible. It was not only the
bishop's privilege to refuse, but his duty. The nomination was entirely
void.
Some ten years later a dispute of broader and quite novel character
53.
54.
55.
56.

Sichel v. Lambert, 15 C. B. N. S. 781, 143 Eng. Reprints 992 (1S64).
13 Q. B. D. 253 (1884).
65 L. T. 568 (1891).
Boyer v. Bishop of Norwich, [1892] A. C. 417.
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over a mandamus commanding a magistrate to hear and determine the
application for summonses against three men charged with having become Jesuits, attracted attention. 7 The Relief Act of 1829, cited against
the three men, provided "in case any person shall after the commencement
of this Act within any part of this United Kingdom be admitted or
become a Jesuit, . . . such person shall be deemed and taken to be guilty
of a misdemeanor, . . . and shall be banished from the United Kingdom
for the term of his natural life." The magistrate, Kennedy, refused to
hear the application on the grounds that the statute was obsolete, and
that the proceeding could only be taken by information by the AttorneyGeneral. Asked if he would allow the action were the charge altered, the
magistrate refused. Whereupon an attempt was made to compel him
to do so. The court, though discharging the case, held the law not to
be obsolete, for in 1898 parliament had refused to repeal this section
of the Roman Catholic Relief Act. This statute, however, had been
intended to get the Jesuits out of the country rather than to punish them.
In any case, the law had not been constantly enforced. Because the
magistrate had discretionary powers, the court would not invalidate
the conclusion of his discretion except where he clearly exceeded the
proper limits. He was not bound to issue a summons at the instance
of an ordinary reformer. Considering these circumstances, the court
refused to grant the writ of mandamus.
In 1913, the distant past awoke when The Times Publishing Company
published a papal bull and supposedly contravened the statute of 1571 0'
The court declared that translation and publication of a papal bull simply
for the information of readers in no way violated the Elizabethan law.
The words of that statute, "publish or put in use," meant publishing
so as to make the bull operative in England. Clearly The Times had
no such intention.
V
Until 1919, despite several rather significant exceptions, the condition
of English Catholics showed many fundamental weaknesses. On almost
any given issue they were more likely to suffer a defeat than to gain
a victory, and, so far as bequests for masses were concerned, West v.
Shuttleworth still held. Ninety years had passed since "Catholic Emancipation"; yet, not only by virtue of exceptions in "relief" legislation
but also on account of hostile court decisions, Catholics were still extensively unemancipated. "No-Popery", while no longer sufficiently
potent to break heads and windows, permitted the application of many
57. Rex v. Kennedy, 86 L. T. 753 (1902).
58. Mathew v. Times Publishing Co. Ltd., 29 T. L. R. 471 (1913).
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restrictions not to say oppressions. A large measure of relief, however,
did materialize through the judgment of Bourne v. Keane.P
Inasmuch as this decision overruled West v. Sluttlewortl0 and the
cases based thereon, namely, Heath v. Chapman,' In re Blundell's
0 3 and In re Elliott,0 ' a summary of the facts
Trusts, 2 In re Fleetwood,
and arguments seems warranted. Lords Birkenhead, Buckmaster, Parmoor, and Atkinson concurred in the decision, but Lord Wrenbury,
reviewing the authorities on the non-disturbance of long-standing decisions, dissented on the ground that West v. Shuttlworth, having been
so long recognized as an authority, ought not to be disturbed. A Catholic
testator bequeathed ;200 to Westminster Cathedral for masses, and
E200 and his residuary personal estate to "the Jesuit Fathers, Farm
Street," for masses. Following West v. Shuttlkworth, the Court of Appeal
voided the gifts as gifts to superstitious uses. At the Bar of the Lords
the next of kin contended that the bequests to the Jesuit Fathers were
void under the act of 1829. The Lords held (1) that the bequests were
not void as gifts to superstitious uses; (2) that the contention of the
next of kin as to the bequests to the Jesuit Fathers failed-by Birkenhead and Atkinson for insufficient evidence concerning the community,
by Birkenhead on the ground that the next of kin had not raised this
point in their case, and by Buckmaster and Parmoor (following In re
SmithE ) because these bequests were for individual members of a particular order resident at a named place and impressed with no trust for
the benefit of the order.
The appellants argued that the will of Henry VIII contained directions for masses, and that the First Book of Common Prayer, composed
after Edward's Chantry Act, included prayers for the dead, although
the Second Book did nof. An analysis of the Chantry Act revealed its
limited application as to time and to character of property. Although
the saying of masses became illegal in 1581, the statute of 1791 had
mitigated this situation. In reviewing penal legislation and litigation,
the appellants dilated upon the paradox of legalizing Catholic worship
and attaching an illegality to ceremonies: if a gift to build a Catholic
cathedral was valid, why not a gift for masses. West v. Shuttleworth
and the cases following it rested on one of two erroneous views, namely,
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

[1919] A. C. S15.
2 My. & K. 684, 39 Eng. Reprints 1106 (Ch. 1S35).
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that the Chantry Act by implication made gifts for masses illegal, or
that such gifts were illegal at the date of the statute. According to
Bowman v. Secular Society,6 the Catholic religion only contravened
statutes; remove these and gifts were legal. West v. Shuttleworth had
turned a relieving act into a penal statute. Gifts for masses were good
in the British dominions, Ireland, and the United States. The implication toward illegality in Edward's act had been removed by the equally
strong implication toward legality in the Charities Act of William IV.
Moreover, to give effect to the Charities Act of 1860, the mass must be
legalized. In rebuttal, the respondents insisted that gifts for masses were
always illegal, that right or wrong, West v. Shuttleworth ought not to
be disturbed, and that In re Smith was a bad decision based on a misconstruction of a will. Even more interesting than these arguments,
however, were the judges' opinions.
Birkenhead informed the Lords that they could not escape the duty
of overruling decisions treated as binding for generations. Bequests for
masses were legal. If his view prevailed, their Lordships would not
within a short time have pronounced valid legacies for the purpose of
denying fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion, and have nullified a bequest for the purpose of celebrating the central rite in a creed
accepted by many millions of their Christian fellow-countrymen, and
the importance of which in the varied history and ceremonies of the
Catholic Church was incalculable. Moreover, England would be brought
into line with Ireland, the dominions, and the United States. Such
considerations might temper the admitted impolicy of disturbing old
conclusions. The common law recognized the validity of gifts for masses:
how strange for that law to discourage gifts recommended by its own
doctrine of frankalmoignel Celebration of the mass survived Edward's
statute; although ousted from the Second Book of Common Prayer and
the Elizabethan Book of Common Prayer, it did not become criminal
until 1581.
Inasmuch as the Edwardian statute was the only basis for the case
against masses, Birkenhead analyzed its historical influence. Duke on
Charitable Uses had been mainly responsible for the idea that the statute
nullified gifts for masses, but Boyle on Charities had defined a superstitious use as "one which has for its object the propagation or the rites
of a religion not tolerated by law." The Relief Act of 1829 undid previous unfavorable decisions; West v. Shuttleworth was not well founded;
the reasoning in Heath v. Chapman was not to be supported. Finally,
masses were not illegal at common law; no act made them illegal before
66.
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1547; the act of Edward (1547) did not make them illegal. Although
they became illegal in 1581, they ceased to be penal offenses in 1791.
Therefore the appeal must be allowed with costs.
The judgments of the other lords, though less comprehensive, possessed considerable interest. Buckmaster and Parmoor, more prosaic,
adverted to Lord Mansfield's opinions on toleration in Harrison v.
Evans. 7 The first stressed the diverse consequences of the Toleration
Act (1689), saw in the Charities Act of 1860 an enabling statute, and
agreed that West v. Shuttle'worth being wrongly decided ought not to
be perpetuated. Parmoor recalled Mansfield's opinion, the common law
"knows of no prosecutions for mere opinion." Atkinson sharply criticized
those responsible for sustaining penal burdens. No preamble to an act,
such as Edward's statute, could be regarded as a coercive provision; any
decision based upon such an assumption must be erroneous. The Catholic religion was not at Henry's death regarded as false. Although the
law of 1832 undid all that had gone before, Cottenham in lWest v.
Shuttleworth had decided that the legacies were not within the law;
yet he considered that statute to establish the illegality of certain gifts"a most unsatisfactory statement of the law." Of the judgment in
Heath v. Chapman, Atkinson observed: "With all respect I think it
would be difficult to compress into such a limited space more historical
and legal inaccuracies.... It is too late in the day to hold in this country
'
ConseGs
that a religious ceremony . . . is merely a superstitious rite.C
quently, he was even prepared to hold that Adams and Lambert's Case"
and others following it were wrongly decided.
Equally interesting was Wrenbury's dissenting opinion. Perhaps from
some points of view, he disregarded vital human factors; nevertheless
when one takes into consideration the confusion that was implicit in
reversing West v. Shuttleworth and therewith its pendant cases, it may
be suggested that his conservatism covered more than the narrow legalist.
Characterizing the mass as a solemn service, he stressed its purpose to
relieve souls in purgatory; a devise for procuring masses affirmed the
doctrine of purgatory. Although neither statute nor common law forbade
the saying or hearing of mass, a devise to procure masses was not
necessarily legal. The dicta of Adams and Lambcrt's Case, a case on
the statute itself, were not to be disregarded, and the dicta opposed
gifts for superstitious uses. As Wrenbury saw the situation, "There is a
statute passed in 1547-an opinion was expressed upon its true construction in 1602-the construction accepted in 1602 was acted upon
67. 3 Bro. P. C. 465, 1 Eng. Reprints 1437 (EL L. 1767).
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judicially in 1835-that judicial decision has been accepted ever since."10
What has been law for over 300 years ought to be retainedl Was it
expedient to overturn judgments in this manner? Should a court, competent to overrule a decision of long standing, overrule it if titles taken
on the footing of the decision were affected? Length of time was a
material consideration. The appeal ought therefore to be dismissed.
Regardless of the logic and sound law in this reasoning, Wrenbury's
opinion has now only an academic interest. The opinions of Birkenhead
and Atkinson were on the other hand especially notable in their deliberate
overturning of a century of unjust and-what was worse from their
viewpoint-unfounded decisions. Undoubtedly Bourne v. Keane has
every claim to be considered a landmark in the history of toleration in
England. Lacking perhaps some of the fiery zeal of the pamphlet, this
judgment like that of Harrison v. Evans, has a value all its own. It
expressed the opinion, the considered opinion, of the highest court in
the land. It expressed that opinion in weighty arguments and dignified
style with a rich substratum of history and law. It stood as a precedent
for subsequent decisions. That for the immediate future at least, the
litigious career of Catholics was to be marked by victories became clear
in the cases following Bourne v. Keane. Though the particular issues
vary, the fundamental principle clearly relates to what had gone before.
In re Barclay71 revived the question of trusts. A testatrix in 1903
willed the residue of her property, after the death of G. who had a life
interest, to "the Superior of the Jesuit Church of the Immaculate Conception... to the Superior of that Church at the moment of the legacy
falling due, and failing him to any other representative Father of the
Order of the Society of Jesus. . . ." The testatrix died in 1910, G. in
1928; the Superior in 1928 was not the one of 1910. A lower court
held the gift to the Superior at the moment of G.'s death valid. On
appeal, it was decided "that the gift was to this Superior upon trust for
the benefit of the church . . . as he might in his discretion think fit;
and that this was a valid gift." Some interesting questions marked the
case, of which the relation of the Catholic relief act of 1926 to what
had gone before had the greatest relevance.7 2 This act was held not
retrospective, so that certain dispositions before that act might be invalid
as infringing the statute of 1829.
The final cases that need be mentioned here largely maintained the
precedent set by Bourne v. Keane. In 1930, concerning a residuary
70. See Bourne v. Keane, [19191 A. C. 815, 922.
71. [19291 2 Ch. 173.
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bequest for the benefit of the Catholic Church, the plaintiffs held that
since nothing restricted the bequest to charitable uses it should be voided,
the more especially because the Catholic Church also had civil functions;
the defendants thought the bequest intended for the particular church
attended by the testatrx. 73 The court considered three answers as to
who got the gift: a particular church, "the quasi-corporate institution
consisting of those persons who carry on the Roman Catholic religion,"
or individual members of the Church. The last would fail for uncertainty;
no evidence supported the first; the second was intended and was a
good gift. In 1932, the Court of Chancery held a devise to the sisters
of a community and to the clergy valid as a good charitable trust given
to good objects of charity.74 Two years later, the same court declared
a gift for saying masses to be a good charitable gift because it assisted
the performance of a ritual, the central act of the religion of a large
number of Christians, by endowing the performers of that act.7
VI
To summarize and interpret the foregoing material in any extensive
fashion is unnecessary, for in most instances the reports of the cases
present the facts and arguments in an adequate degree. Attention has
of course been directed not toward any technical items of law, either
as to substance or procedure, but toward the attitude of English courts
and law on various matters of high concern to millions of people. In
estimating the significance of these cases, one should remember their
indicative as well as their imperative role. Not only did they penalize
or benefit specific members of a religious minority, they also pointed the
way for the whole group. Likewise, the particular cases here gathered
together indicate what might prove a fruitful source of investigation,
namely, the records of lesser courts. The atmosphere of feverish controversy created by demagogues has perhaps too long been accepted by
historians as the complete story. "No-Popery" was undoubtedly a powerful party cry, but, inasmuch as in other times and countries the planks
of a political platform have not always expressed the daily social philosophy of the rank and file, it is difficult to believe that the citizenry of
England was constantly at white heat over religious isses. The records
of lower and local courts might well reveal to what extent Catholics
were not persecuted.
Here, however, the concern has to a large extent been directed to
the opposite aim. As suggested at the outset, the cases which fiber this
73. In re Schoales, [1930] 2 Ch. 75.
74. In re James, [19323 2 Ch. 25.
75. In re Caus, [1934] Ch. 162.
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account drive home in a clearcut fashion what the penal laws meant
and how they might be painfully and perhaps indirectly applied years
after the event for which the laws were made, when, all passion spent,
the ancient catchwords and long dead controversies experienced a
mechanical resurrection. Additional value derives from perusing these
disputes through the opportunity to observe the character of the arguments and opinions. The reasoning and prejudices of the advocates
and the judges have a place in the history of thought not less than the
systems of philosophers and the fiery zeal of pamphleteers. Furthermore,
the direct relation of these arguments and opinions to coercive activity
gave them a relevance not always apparent in the expression of sentiments, no matter how noble or convincing. While undoubtedly some
cases discussed here arose as test cases to reform the law by revealing
its shortcomings, an atmosphere ranging from oppressive bigotry to
callous selfishness permeates a great many.
Although the legal status of English Catholics has unmistakably
improved since 1829, the very appearance in courts of law of such issues
as those summarized above evidences a precarious situation in the recent
past. With the tide of decisions turning steadily in Catholic favor or
at least against those who would badger and persecute the sect, however,
the litigious experiences of Catholics are likely to decrease. Be that as.
it may, the full story of their persecution cannot be appreciated without
attention to those experiences during the last four centuries.

